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The purpose of this publication is to serve as an organ ofAsbury
Theological Seminary for the dissemination of material of interest
and value primarily to its immediate constituency of alumni, stu
dents andfriends, but also to a broader readership of churchmen,
theologians, students and other interested persons.
Material published in this journal appears here because of its in
trinsic value in the on-going discussion of theological issues. While
this publication does not pretend to compete with those theological
journals specializing in articles of technical scholarship, it affirms
a commitment to rigorous standards of academic integrity and
prophetic forthrightness.
Editorial Note
by Melvin E. Dieter, Editor
Clement of Alexandria believed that the ultimate prayer was to
make the whole of life a prayer. So we might say that the true teacher
is one for whom in some sense teaching becomes life and life,
teaching. How often students have confessed that they have been
shaped by the personality and character of good teachers long after
the contents of their lectures have faded away. The reputations and
usefulness of institutions are borne along as much by who was
teaching as by what was being taught.
In this issue of the Seminarian we pay honor to three men who for
decades have enriched the spiritual and academic life of the Asbury
Theological Seminary community.
Dr. Harold B. Kuhn has served the seminary for 38 years in the
area of Philosophy of Religion. For 36 of those years he served as
editor of this journal.
Professor John S. Tremaine has served for 19 years in the Church
Music Department; he has become well known across the nation as
the director of the Asbury Theological Seminary Singing Seminarians.
Dr. Thomas A. Carruth, professor of Prayer and Spiritual Life,
has completed 18 years of service. He has had the unique honor of
serving as the first head of such a department in American
theological seminaries.
We are printing a festschrift article for each by colleagues to say
"Thank you and God bless you! Christ has been honored by your
ministry among us. We have learned more about Him because we
have known you."
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Spirituality
and Ministry^
by J. Steven Harper
Recently I was visiting with one of our students who has been
interviewing pastors in the area. His question to them was: "What is
the greatest frustration you face in the day-to-day practice of
ministry?" The answers were varied, but one struck me as
particularly important for this article. That minister responded by
saying, "My greatest frustration is loss of vision and motivation. It is
too easy to let my work deteriorate into sterile professionalism and
the mere practice of certain skills."
This fellow is not alone in his frustration. In the past several years
mainline denominations have begun to address the issue of
"ministerial burnout." While the causes of this are many, it is
generally recognized that the problem is related to the quality of
spiritual life. For many ministers the "springs of living water" have
ceased to flow, and the result is dryness and lack of purpose in the
practice of ministry. One of the largest denominations in America is
developing a program of spiritual formation for its ministers. A full-
time spiritual director has been appointed to move through the
denomination to help ministers revitalize their spiritual lives.
Concerns for ministerial spirituality are also being felt in
theological education. The Association of Theological Schools is
emphasizing the need for spiritual formation among students. Dr.
James I. McCord has called for a greater appreciation for
"devotional theology" and a closer integration of the academic and
spiritual dimensions of theological education.^ At this point we have
cause to rejoice because Asbury Theological Seminary was the first
school to develop a Department of Prayer and Spiritual Life. For
nearly twenty years Dr. Thomas Carruth has given dynamic
leadership to this important area in seminary life. But we know there
Since 1980, Dr. Steven Harper has been assistant professor of
English Bible and Prayer and Spiritual Life at Asbury Theological
Seminary.
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is still much more to be done.
In this article my concern rests mainly with the person who is
already out of seminary. I am concerned about the enriching of those
who are already caught up in the day-to-day struggles of ministry.
Are there principles which can be applied to life which will result in a
revitalization of spirituality among the clergy? I believe there are, and
I would Uke to write about them under the categories of integration,
inspiration, intercession, and interaction.
Integration
It is my growing conviction that the greatest need for ministers is a
sense of integration in what they are doing. Fragmentation is too
often the order of the day. It goes under the names of "busyness"and
"wearing too many hats." It results in a crisis of identity which
expresses itself in preoccupation, boredom, depression, a sense of
unfulfillment, and even resentment.^
Often these feelings spring from a problem in the spiritual life. In
evangelical circles we have too easily compartmentalized our
devotional life. We speak of having a "quiet time" and we have many
resources to help us. But by putting the major emphasis on the time
we spend with God at the beginning and end of our day, we can be
seduced into thinking that the rest of the day belongs to us. Having
had our "quiet time" we move out to live in the "unquiet time."
Obviously it is not that simplistic, but it is true that by limiting our
understanding of devotion we can forget that all of our time belongs
to God. Even in our spirituality we can make the unfortunate
dichotomy between the secular and the sacred. "This time is set aside
for God," we say, "the rest of the time is for business."When we begin
to think and live this way, we are on the road to fragmentation. We
lose the sense of being guided through the day, and instead we feel
pushed through it. We lose a feeUng of control and find a feeling of
oppression. E. Stanley Jones is absolutely correct when he says, "If
we lose a sense of being led, we become victims of our circumstances."*
We begin to recover a sense of integration when we realize that our
whole life is a devotional experience. As Wesleyan Christians we
should be able to pick up on this. The Puritans had taught Wesley
that "every moment is a God moment." So even before Aldersgate he
had learned that true devotion was a life lived before God, not just a
time to be alone with God. 5 Dr. Albert Outler has recently given an
excellent definition of Wesleyan devotion by calling it "life in the
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Spirit, life from God, to God, and with God."^ To the extent that we
begin to reorient our lives to this comprehensive understanding of
devotion, we will be able to find a sense of integration in our
spirituality.
There are many practical dimensions of integration which could be
mentioned at this point, but none more important than the practice
of solitude. The mystics have historically called it "centering down."
The phrase itself is descriptive of the process of finding a sense of
unity and integration in life. In our day of fast-paced living, when our
calendars become our taskmasters, it is a rare thing to find persons
who know how to "be still." In fact, it is not unusual to find people
who either fear silence and being left alone, or who do not know what
to do with silence when they have it. We are conditioned by the media
to think of silence as "dead air time." In the place of solitude we put
noise, crowds, and words. ^
The recovery of solitude will enhance our sense of integration in
our spiritual lives. Solitude creates the space necessary for us to hear
the inner Voice. It provides the opportunity for us to form our own
ideas and set realistic priorities. It reminds us that life is to be lived
from the heart. And it fosters the affections necessary to genuinely
care for others and relate to them. Far from being "dead air time,"
solitude is the necessary wellspring from which God-directed action
flows. Maxie Dunnam puts it this way, "Solitude is thus preparation
for more honest relationship and more dehberate participation with
others and the world.
Integration is necessary for spirituality in anyone, but it is
particularly important for the minister. How tragic if we who are
supposed to "seek first the Kingdom" succumb to the temptation of
our age to become hollow persons. Because we are self-employed we
have an opportunity to carve out the time necessary for solitude.
Because of the nature of our vocation we have the opportunity to live
our days in the presence of God and in the name of Jesus Christ. We
must not let these opportunities for integration pass through our
fingers, otherwise we will be the blind leading the blind. Instead, we
must "walk in the light as He is in the light" and minister to others
from the resources of integration rather than the crumbs of
fragmentation.
Inspiration
It would be a mistake to equate integration in particular or
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spirituality in general with abstractions. It is true that spirituality is,
of necessity, related to the nonmaterial and supernatural dimensions
of life. But this does not mean it lacks content. On the contrary, a
mature spirituality will be developed by conscious instruction
through the classic sources of inspiration. In evangelical circles we
speak often of the need to "disciple" people. As ministers we see this
as one of our primary tasks. But we must not forget that we too need
to "be discipled." To be sure, this knowledge has been a major factor
in the rise of continuing education programs for ministers, but there
is also the sense in which we must "be discipled" every day. It is my
conviction that this should happen primarily through our encounters
with Scripture and the devotional classics.
As Wesleyans we stand in the tradition of him who said, "I am a
man of one book." It would be hard to imagine anyone reading more
books than John Wesley, or to read them in as many fields as he did.
His reading lists are challenges to depth and variety in our reading
today.' Yet, he never lost his perspective. The Bible always remained
the central work and the touchstone by which he evaluated
everything else that he read. He said himself that he allowed no other
rule, whether of faith or practice, than the Holy Scriptures, and that
he followed it in all things great and small. We continue to do well to
remember that the Bible is the primary spiritual guide, even for us in
the practice of ministry.
And yet, it is difficult for us to read the Bible devotionally. As
ministers we too easily approach the Bible as a sermon starter rather
than a personal developer. A fellow pastor has written of this
problem and said, "I was not aware, at the time, of how my
devotional life was affected by this frustration. In retrospect, I now
see that when I turned to the Word to find personal help and
inspiration, subconsciously my mind would begin to whirl . . . 'Just
how can this scripture become a sermon?' It was not long until the joy
of reading God's Word seemed to abate and become a chore. I was
merely reading the Bible as a professional sermon-maker."'"
I feel this temptation in myself There is a sense in which I do not
want to completely overcome it, for I know I am charged with a
particular responsibility to proclaim the Word to those under my
care. But at the same time, I know I must encounter the Bible purely
as a believer, stripped of all my degrees and professionalism, and
with no eye to "making something out of it." Practically, I have had
to use material which is not directly related to my ministry." I also
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find that I need to keep the time simple and brief I agree with E.
Stanley Jones that the devotional life is "food for the day" and I do
not need to stuff myself on Scripture to be fed by it. But I do need a
steady diet of it for my soul's health. Then to the extent that I am
growing through my study of Scripture, I can move out in service to
others.
Related to the matter of inspiration is a newer discovery. I am
growing in my appreciation for the devotional classics as means for
my personal discipleship. Richard Foster is correct when he
describes our problem in terms of superficiality.' 2 Religiously and
theologically we are the victims of modernity. '^ Our spirituality has
also suffered because of a sense of rootlessness. As I travel across the
country, I find that ministers (and laity also) are focusing their
devotional reading in the most recent publications. Falling prey to
the "cult of the contemporary" presents the danger of developing a
pop spirituality.
Lest I be misunderstood, let me hasten to say that I find nothing
inherently wrong with keeping up-to-date and reading quality
material recently published. Additionally, we can be thankful that
there is a resurgence of interest in spirituality and many good books
are being written to guide us in our devotional development. But
what I'm calling for is a discovery of the devotional classics as means
of nourishment. We stand on the shoulders of nearly two thousand
years of Christian spirituality. We are not the first ones to walk the
road of spiritual life and face the problems related to the journey. By
reading the classics we are inspired to a greater sense of community.
We can gain insight into our specific needs. We can avoid making
some of the mistakes which our predecessors have made. We can lose
our superficiality and take on a new sense of "roots"in our Christian
experience. The classics have a stabilizing and enriching effect upon
our spirituality.'^ Again, as Wesleyans, this should be attractive to us
because of our appreciation for tradition as one of the formative
influences in the Christian faith.
The matter of inspiration is of utmost importance for the minister.
We, no less than those to whom we minister, must be growing in the
grace and knowledge of Jesus Christ. The problem of "burnout" is
related to the feeling of having no more to give. It is folly to think we
can be in a giving, serving vocation for a lifetime without receiving all
along the way. When inspiration ceases in ministry we either "give
out" or we retreat into yesterday's experience and material. Either
8
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way our life and work loses its cutting edge.'^
Intercession
What has been said so far is not unique to the clergy. Any person's
quest for true spirituality must include the aspects of integration and
inspiration. However, when it comes to intercession, there is a special
dimension for those in ordained ministry. While everyone is called to
practice intercession for others, the ordained minister does exercise a
particular "priestly function."
In most forms of ministry one is responsible for a group of people.
A significant act of ministerial devotion is interceding for these
people. Traditionally, we have understood this in the context of
prayer where the minister takes to heart the needs of his congregation
and lifts those needs to God. Dr. Tom Carruth has reminded us well
that the willingness to be an intecessor requires that we first offer
ourselves to God.'^ In other words, prayer begins as an act of self-
surrender. In the spiritual life this is a critical barrier to overcome.
While no one denies that we must be concerned about our spiritual
formation, there is also the need to transcend self. There is the need to
take the focus of integration and the input of inspiration and turn
them outward in acts of love toward others. The priest is one who not
only seeks his own salvation, but also one who prays and works for
the salvation of those around him.
In terms of spirituality this means that intercession will go beyond
the traditional linkage of it with prayer. It will also include actions
which "flesh out" the concerns which are born in the prayer room.
Kenneth Leech has broadened the idea of intercession by describing
it as "our cooperation with God in the work of reconciliation."'^
Kenneth Kinghorn has described the true disciple as a "co-creator
with God."'8
There are at least two implications of this for spiritual life. First,
true intercession frees us from trying to force our desires for others
on God. Rather, true intercession is our attempt to discover God's
desires for others. In intercession, especially intercessory prayer, we
are seeking to know the means by which God would reconcile others
to Himself. To be sure, we are free and invited to share our desires
about others with Him. But deeper than that is our concern to know
His heart.
The second implication is that intercession is not "passing the
buck" to God about another. We are called to enter in to the
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redemptive process as instruments in God's hands. This is why our
intercession can never be divorced from ideas like "action," "service,"
and "involvement." Again, Dr. Carruth has reminded us
. . . our bodies are very important in intercessory prayer
because they are channels through which God communicates
himself. . . . The body communicates through a smile, a
handshake, a look of compassion, a voice, a kind embrace,
or in service.''
One of the needs of the human being is the desire to feel wanted,
even significant. By expanding intercession into the area of "mission"
and "action" we come to see that God needs and wants us to join him
in the process of reconciliation. On a day-to-day basis in the practice
of ministry we truly discover this dimension as we concretely touch
lives in His name. This not only gives expression to our spiritual lives,
but at the same time creates a sense of joy as we see God at work
through us.
A word of caution is in order at this point. Many ministers fall into
the trap of feeling indispensable in the work of reconciliation.
Consequently, they become workaholics at the expense of their
families and their own health. They live with the words of Paul on
their lips: "I can do all things through Christ who strengthens me"
and they take the "all things" quite literally. What they forget is that
while God can enable us to do anything, he does not ask us to do
everything. True spirituality includes the ability to recognize our
limitations, as well as the ability to see our potential. Unfortunately,
some ministers have never learned this, and they burn themselves out
in a feverish and unrealistic attempt "to be all things to all men" and
effectively handle anything that comes up.
True intercession demands a certain amount of selectivity � a
sense of priority. Charlie Shedd has been a great help to me in this
regard. Having been appointed to a suburban church in one of the
fastest growing cities in America, he soon found himself over
whelmed with job demands. For a while he attempted to do it all,
only to learn that he could not, and that his effectiveness was reduced
when he tried to. One day it dawned upon him that even Jesus didn't
"do it all." He didn't heal everyone in Palestine. He didn't move at the
same pace day-after-day. He did not permit an audience to everyone.
Shedd began to be selective, attempting prayerfully to discern
10
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God's will for his ministry. He had to let some things go. New
opportunities arose to which he had to say no. But in cutting back, he
actually went forward with a renewed sense of divine guidance.
Consequently, he wrote, "Our creator does not expect us to do every
good work that needs doing. . . . Some things are outside the sphere
of our divine assignment, and we take a mighty step forward when we
sense this truth. "20
Intercession is a major feature of ministerial spirituality, both
because of the nature of our calling and the immensity of the task.
Intercession is the opportunity to live out the implications of our
devotion and at the same time experience further renewal. In its
dimensions of prayer and service it does demand discernment and
selectivity; otherwise the needs we discover will drive us to despair
rather than to action.
Interaction
It is this dimension of spirituality which saves us from privatized
devotion. While each of the preceding elements can and should have
corporate expression, it is this final dimension which makes
spirituality intentionally related to the larger community of faith. To
my way of thinking it is a dimension greatly needed in and among
ordained ministers.
There are two reasons for this. The first is that interaction
demands that we reflect upon our life and work. And reflection is
often missing in the practice ofministry. Like the pastor we met at the
beginning of the acticle, we find ourselves "practicing skills" without
much reflection upon the meaning and significance of them for
ourselves and others. Interaction begins when we reflect in these
areas of our ministry.
This is not easy. For one thing, true interaction means that we
must face ourselves honestly and come to grips with our weaknesses
as well as our strengths. Often interaction is an uncomfortable
experience, and many prefer to by-pass the process. Until recently
denominations have not really dealt with the limitations of their
clergy. They have just passed them along to a new appointment
where the self-destructive process starts over again. But the facts are
coming in: bad ministers make bad churches. Boards ofministry are
having to develop evaluative means to help ministers deal with their
problems. Seminaries are expanding supervised ministry and intern
programs to facilitate this kind of reflection even before ordination.
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We are coming to see that no spirituality is complete unless it
contains the dimension of self-reflection, evaluation, and critique.
On the personal level this can be enhanced through journal
keeping.2' Through this medium we are enabled to record the events
of our lives and reflect upon them. We can "walk around ourselves"
and see the positive and negative dimensions of our personal and
professional growth. We can take our discoveries and our hopes, our
affirmations and our confessions and formulate them into prayers. 22
The written word becomes a fixed means of returning to the events of
our lives and to more objectively measure growth in the grace and
knowledge of Jesus Christ. Many people do not sense growth
because they only sense it when dramatic events take place.
Journaling helps us to see that we are constantly changing, most
often in little ways. By recording and reflecting we are enabled to see
the importance of "httle things" for spiritual growth.
The second reason why interaction is so important for ministers is
too many of us have adopted a "Lone Ranger" approach to our life
and work. We are continually asking others to open themselves to us
so that we may minister to them, but we do not open ourselves to
others in return so they can minister to us. Not only are we failing to
practice what we preach, but more importantly we are suffering
under the false illusion that ministers must be self-contained units
who portray the image of having it all together. This is not true and
neither is it healthy. Interaction calls us to relate to others and allow
them to minister to us. Self-reflection is expanded into group
reflection.
We need more of this on the level of professional relationships. It is
true that every pastor needs a pastor. Ministers need to be ministered
to by their peers who can more perfectly empathize with the feelings
which the vocation of ministry generates. Interaction with a peer
group also gives us the chance to focus on topics of mutual interest
that will result in personal and professional spiritual growth.
Interaction also saves us from "the Elijah complex"23 and gives us a
greater sense of community and support. Every minister should have
at least one other minister (and preferably a group) to whom he is
responsible and with whom he may share common interests and
concerns. This is one of the best forms of continuing education I
know.
But it does not stop here. Interaction also needs to exist with laity.
One of the worst pieces of advice I ever received was the counsel that
12
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ministers should not form close friendships within their congregation.
I'm glad I saw it to be such and never followed it. To do so would
have been to violate a basic tenet of humanity � the need to make
friends. But even more, I would have denied myself of one of the
richest sources of support and guidance I have ever experienced in
the ministry. The mere fact that lay men and women are not in it "full
time" gives a different perspective on the Christian faith. This
perspective is often enriching for those of us who get so close to our
work that we can't see the forest for the trees.
Furthermore, it is in interaction with laity that we often experience
the deepest forms of koinonia. It is unrealistic for ministers to think,
"It I share my problems and struggles with my people, they won't
respect me or look to me for guidance. "To be sure, there are limits of
propriety, but those limits can be broader than many ministers have
been willing to admit or experience. It is far worse to portray an
image of "victory" and "being above the common cares ofmen. " I am
happy to write that some of my deepest concerns have been shared
with persons in my churches. They have wrestled with me to find
answers. They have exhorted me in times of depression and doubt.
They have corrected me when my perspective was hazy. They have
shown me much of what Paul meant when he described the church as
"the body of Christ."
Interaction is that essential process in spirituality which moves us
from the private to the corporate, from the individual to the
communal. In that movement we find insight, encouragement,
reproof, and fresh motivation. Things happen when we are in the
presence of others which can and will never happen if we limit our
spiritual pilgrimage to a solitary walk.
These then are some of the disciplines which seem to me to be
particularly appropriate for ordained ministers. While we can
certainly avail ourselves of devotional disciplines common to all
Christians, there are dimensions of our life and work which call for
special attention. Above all, we must not allow the lure of
professionalism to mask our need for personal spiritual growth. For
even as we exhort our fellow Christians to grow in the grace and
knowledge of Jesus Christ, we hear the call of the Master saying,
"Physician, heal thyself."
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Footnotes
'I am particularly grateful for the opportunity to write this article in honor of Dr.
Tom Carruth. Dr. Tom has enriched my life in numerous ways, and his influence
extends far and wide. One of his great concerns, which this article addresses, is the
spiritual life of the minister.
Uames I. McCord, "The Seminary Enterprise: An Appraisal," Theological
Education. Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 53-58.
^Henri Nouwen, Making All Things A'ewCNew York: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 28-
32.
*E. Stanley Jones, Abundant L;vj>i^ (Nashville: Abindgon Festival, 1976), p. 248.
'Those interested in a more comprehensive analysis of Wesley's devotional life may
refer to my Ph.D. dissertation, "The Devotional Life of John Wesley: 1703-1738."
(Durham: Duke University, 1981).
'Frank Whaling, ed., John and Charles Wesley (New York: Paulist Press, 1981),
p. xiii.
^Richard Foster, Celebration of Discipline (New York: Harper & Row, 1978),
chapter 7.
*Maxie Dunnam, The Workbook ofLiving /Ya>'er (Nashville: Upper Room, 1974),
p. 32.
�V.H.H. Green, The Young Mr. W'^fe;' (London: Edward Arnold, 1961), pp. 305-
319.
'�C.D. Acheson, "Professional Bible Reading Is Hazardous to Your Health,"
Preacher's Magazine, January 1981, p. 8.
"I recommend the use of"Discovery" or "Encounter with God"which are two series
produced by Scripture Union, 1716 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103.
'^Foster, p. 1.
'^One of the best books that examines the problem of modernity in theology is
Thomas Oden's Agenda for Theology (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979).
'*Two good ways to become familiar with the devotional classics are, (1) Thomas
Kepler's Anthology of Devotional Literature (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1979) and (2) The Upper Room Devotional Classics (Nashville: Upper Room, n.d.).
"cf. D.G. Kehl, "Burnout: The Risk of Reaching Too High," Christianity Today,
November 20, 1981, pp. 26-28.
'*Thomas Carruth, Prayer: A Christian Ministry (Nashville: Tidings, 1971), p. 28.
"Kenneth Leech, ^ue Prayer (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 25.
'^Kenneth Kinghorn, Dynamic Discipleship (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1975), pp. 141-157.
"Carruth, p. 29.
20Charlie Shedd, Timefor All Things (Nashville: Abingdon Festival, 1980), p. 56.
2'One of the most helpful books on keeping a journal is Morton Kelsey's Journey
Inward (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1980).
^^Henri Nouwen 's A Cryfor Mercy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981) is a good
example of this kind of written prayer.
"The "Elijah complex" is a term for the feeling that we are all alone in the work God
has called us to do.
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Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart
A Man Through Whom God Sings
by Donald E. Demaray
God reveals himself through the music of Mozart perhaps more
than any other composer in the classic tradition. The freshness,
playfulness, and sense of having discovered the center of things, lay
hold upon human souls at great depth, and set up vibrations that
seem to articulate in harmony with the universe. The delicate
patterns remind one of the finest Belgian lace; the minuet motifs
picture graceful 18th century dancing in royal courts; the
transparency of Mozart's work calls to mind the magnificent cut
glass creations of his century. In a remarkable way this prolific music
maker gathers up the arts of his time and brings the arts of all time to
an apex that pierces the sky and lets us see a little bit into heaven.
Early Days
Precocity in both composition and performance cannot find
explanation apart from God. Providence opened the door to divinity
in the music of Mozart, and the door came ajar at a surprisingly early
age. From age four until his death at 35 he composed virtually
nonstop on a daily basis. At age three his gifts surfaced and his father
began to teach him music. Little minuets came from his creative mind
right away. At age six he and his sister, Maria Anna, performed in
Munich. He played a few months later for a fascinated court in
Vienna, and taught himself violin and organ. At age seven he
appeared in Paris where his first works came to publication. In the
next year London royalty delighted to his sight-reading, spontaneity,
creativity, and general all-round musicianship. Before age 10 he
published his first symphony, did six sonatas for violin and harps,
and made friends with important people in the musical world. In
1767 he composed an oratorio and the next year his first opera was
completed.
Dr. Donald Demaray is the Granger andAnna Fisher Professor of
Preaching at Asbury Theological Seminary.
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Life Fully Lived
Born in Salzburg, January 27, 1756, he died in Vienna, December
5, 1791. Those intervening years brought to the world some of the
most substantive music of all time. No one doubts his genius. Goethe
illustrated genius by reference to Mozart who struck him as "the
human incarnation of a divine force ofcreation." The sheer quality of
the music witnesses to Goethe's description, but what astounds one is
the vast quantity of excellent material. Rarely do strength and range
come to the marriage altar and stay married thirty years!
The Ktfchel listing of the works (updated by Alfred Einstein)
numbers 626. He wrote operas, masses, oratorios, cantatas,
symphonies, divertimentos, concertos (for piano, string instruments
and wind instruments), string quartets and quintets, piano sonatas,
piano fantasias, piano and viohn sonatas, piano trios and quartets,
wind and string quartets and quintets, organ works, and more.
More than one authority believes Wolfgang wrote music as
ordinary people write letters. He found both his work and his
recreation in composing: "Composing is my one joy and passion."
Poor health, poverty, and difficult experiences seemed to have no
power to rob him of the joy of creating. Life, fun and grace were
never absent from his scores. The listener's taste buds come to
stimulation and this creates an appetite for more and more (Mozart
acquired his taste from the Italians); the substance of his music stirs
the cognitive powers of his listener (Mozart gleaned knowledge from
the Germans); the aesthetic nature finds fulfillment in the elegance of
his music (Mozart learned beauty and dignity from the French).
Haydn once said to Wolfgang's father, Leopold, "I tell you before
God, and as an honest man, that your son is the greatest composer I
know, either personally or by name; he has taste, and apart from that
the greatest science in composition."
Karl Barth
The great theologian expresses his delight in life and beauty in his
celebrated essay, "Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart." So taken was he
with Mozart that he could say, "I have already been asked whether or
not on the basis of my theological thinking I have discovered any
other masters in the field of music. I must confess: there is he and
nobody else." Barth listened to Mozart on recording first thing each
morning, then read the press, and only next moved to work on his
Dogmatik. The Basel theologian admits that when he gets to heaven
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he wishes first to inquire about Mozart, and only then about
Augustine, Thomas, Luther, Calvin and Schleiermacher.
Karl Barth helps us by his insightful statement that Mozart had no
message, no autobiographical statement, no communication of
musical rules. "Mozart does not wish to say anything at all; he just
sings and sounds." He does not "intrude a thing upon the hearer, he
does not ask decisions or comments of him, he just lets him alone."
This quality allows us to see the nature of pure art. When a would-be
artist attempts to "say" something, in that moment he robs his work
of art. The best praise to God always comes transparent and
uncalculated. The very humility, the sense of dependence unwittingly
communicated, the total lack of manipulation, all combine to make
art. Tolkien's works are an example, for according to his own
admission he had no theological statement to project, yet he does just
that. Innocence and witness turn out to be Siamese twins. And
another grand principle: freedom, freedom in its purest state, comes
to those who just pass on what they hear from God, with no attempt
to impress, only to express. Mozart's unhampered expression reveals
God.
God in Puzzles
Three great puzzles loom into view sooner or later. The first. How
could Mozart produce such pure, free music and still remain a child?
In a sense, Wolfgang never grew up. Some authorities believe he
never matured because of his contradictory life, his impractical ways,
his lack of order, his inability to conduct himself in much of a
businesslike manner. His mind filled with liberated notations,
playful and joyous. His work strikes the human ear with the glad
news of relief and lightheartedness, and brings an enormous
emancipation, the kind one must feel upon release from kidnappers.
Only a child possesses that capacity to free the human spirit. "If only
we could allow the child in us to continue to roam! "cries Bill Moyers
in his Smithsonian article on creativity.
We all have a little child in us; psychiatrists tell us ifwe develop the
adult to the dwarfing of the child, we imprison our native instincts
and creative urges. But rare indeed is the one who has allowed the
child as much freedom as Mozart. While at a game of billiards he
would compose in his head. While sitting at the piano he would
improvise with marvelous brilliance. His mind focused intently,
absorbed. Life could go rushing by, life could be filled with
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contradictory behavior, but the music must go on. All human beings
contradict themselves, some more than others. Wise human beings
learn to live with contradictions in themselves and in others.
The second puzzle relates to work and play. For Mozart, work was
play and play was work. Talk about industry! No man ever invested
himself more assiduously; no one ever spent himself more
conscientiously. Yet Mozart hardly thought of himself as a
workaholic. If he bothered to examine his motives, his emotions, his
mind's workings � he was, after all, a human being � these kinds of
self-analyses evidently stayed at a minimal, not optimal, level. The
result: unfettered expression.
Yes, a lovely lightness characterizes Mozart's music, but not the
unsubstantiality which characterizes the ease of modem mood
music. Yes, a marvelous unburdening quality enters the music of the
Viennese master, but not release from responsibility. "That which is
heavy floats and what is light weighs immensely," said an insightful
person. Says Karl Barth, commenting on that statement, "Certainly,
Mozart's singular quality is connected with this inconsistency � or
rather with the fact that this does not constitute an inconsistency for
him,"
The third puzzle: his enigmatic religious posture. How can a man,
baptized in the Roman Catholic faith, one day turn Freemason?
How can one who writes score upon score for the Church behave as
he did? Does the answer find its roots in his immaturity, his
unordered childishness, his preoccupation with music over virtually
everything else? We can hardly excuse the man on the one hand, and
on the other we dare not react in superficial judgment, for only God
knows the depths and genuine motivations of any human heart.
Albert Einstein would sign politically unorthodox documents upon
request from interested parties, apparently with little awareness of
what he did. He had his mind on "more important" things.
Could the answer lie in the sovereignty ofGod? God can work even
through enigmatic characters. Some such figures loom on the
horizon more vividly than others. We leave the matter in God's
hands.
Who Then Was Mozart?
A composer open by grace to divinity. He heard the music of the
spheres, and the compelling forces within him expressed themselves
in flutes, organs, pianos, orchestras, quartets and quintets. He seems
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not even to have confronted temptations to limit himself to
conventional patterns, either of score writing or professional
discipline. If he had forced himself into some kind of programming,
his creative gift would have foundered like a ship hopelessly moored
in a sand bar. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart � liberated, playful, a
fun-loving soul � did not capture God. God captured him with the
result that we know a little more about the character of eternity.
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The Panentheism of
Charles Hartshorne:
A Critique
by Laurence W. Wood
A serious attempt to refute traditional theism is made by Charles
Hartshorne, He polemicizes that traditional theism is "an incorrect
translation of the central religious idea into philosophical
categories,"' His voluminous writings attempt to show that
traditional theism is self-refuting because of its contradictory
affirmations, 2 In language reminiscent of Nietzsche, he suggests it
might be a "hoax of priestcraft.
He proposes a "neo-classical theism" as the only means for
preserving the logic of belief in God.* Some Christian theologians
(notably, John Cobb, Jr., and Schubert Ogden) appeal to
Hartshorne in much the same way as Thomas Aquinas appealed to
Aristotle. Ogden says Hartshorne's panentheism is "perfectly
compatible" with the Bible and is the only means for presenting the
Christian message to the contemporary mind.'
This paper intends in part to assess Hartshorne's interpretation of
traditional theism. It intends also to focus upon the common
concerns of his panentheism and traditional theism, while at the
same time pointing out their possible differences. While the
sympathies of this writer will be obvious, no claim is being made to
prove philosophically that traditional theism is true and that
Hartshorne's neo-theism is false. This paper more modestly intends
to be an analytical interpretation of some aspects of these two theistic
perspectives and pointing out their possible implications for religious
philosophy.
1. The Possibility of a Natural Theology
Henry N. Wieman praises Hartshorne because his natural
Dr. Laurence Wood is Associate Professor of Systematic
Tiieoiogy at Asbury Theological Seminary.
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theology "makes no appeal to revelation,. faith, intuition, mystic
vision, authority, paradox, or any of the devices by which religious
teachers and thinkers exempt their ideas from rational criticism.
For Hartshorne, truth is identical to conceptual clarity. Meta
physical truth is the abstract reality of what is exemplified in the
actual world. Whatever is conceivable is intelligible and what is
intelligible is reality itself. What cannot be known as it essentially is
cannot be real.' If God exists, then His essence must be rationally
comprehensible and He must be capable of being talked about
literally without resorting to metaphor, equivocation, and paradox.
Especially such metaphors as God is a father should be dropped.^
Hartshorne's attempt at a natural theology is a needed corrective
in protestant theology which labors under the inhibitions of Kant's
dictum that there can be no theoretical proof for God's existence.
However, he fails to see that while a natural theology is inprinciple a
possibility, in practice it cannot be successful apart from revelation.
Contemporary Thomists insist that protestant theologians have
greatly misunderstood their idea of natural theology. Battista
Mondin particularly shows that Thomistic natural theology is not a
pure natural theology. He shows that Barth's criticism of natural
theology has weight against the deistic philosophers of the eighteenth
century who believed God's existence is provable without recourse to
revelation, but that is not the position of Thomism.'
While the existence of God should be self-evident from a
consideration of the contingency of the world (which demands a self-
existent being to account for the fact of its dependent being), in
practice this knowledge is clouded by the distorting influence of evil
upon human perception. Unlike the popular misunderstanding of
Thomism in Protestant circles, Aquinas also taught that every part of
human life has been negatively influenced by evil, including the
ability to reason correctly. E.L. Mascall, a contemporary spokesman
for Thomism, says: "One does not have to be Calvinist to
acknowledge that sin has weakened human reason to see clearly what
should be so obvious about God's existence. Yet grace restores the
mind as well as the heart to its proper integrity, "lo
This does not mean a Christian has a higher intelligence than a
non-theist, but it does mean he is existentially capable of insight
unavailable to him before. Perception of truth is always more than
intellectual exercise; our perceptions have an affectional dimension
as well. Mondin writes of the Thomist position:
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The believer is not endowed with an extra-power, that the
unbeliever does not possess. What distinguishes the believer
from the unbeliever is faith, and faith is no knowing power,
but a mere habit which gives to the knowing power
previously existing (i.e. to reason) a disposition to accept as
true, and meaningful, what otherwise would be rejected as
false and nonsensical. ' '
The debate between Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston
illustrates this impasse between the theist and the non-theist.
Copleston, a Thomist philosopher, admits their conclusions about
God's existence are different because their "ideas of philosophy are
radically different."'^ It is appropriate and possible to discuss natural
theology with non-theists, but the theist recognizes that natural
theology is successful only from the standpoint of revelation.
Hartshorne's revision of the ontological argument is unconvincing.
Even before Kant, Aquinas argued against the sheer idea of God as
constituting a theistic proof. The reality of God is more than a
question of logic alone. If God exists, it is to be demonstrated upon a
realist perception of truth. That is, the truth of reality is mediated
directly through sensory experience. A realist perception of truth,
while of course it cannot be logically proved, is more able to justify its
postulates about reality than can an idealist perspective. Even the
idealist in practice has to live like a realist.
An idealist interpretation of truth tends to draw deductive,
infallible, absolute conclusions about reality. For example,
Hartshorne asserts that the essence of God is altogether explicable
through modal logic. Such an identification of God with human
reason is staggering even to those theists who are committed to an
idealist perspective. On the other hand, an epistemological reaHst
holds to the twin postulates that reality is mediated directly through
our senses and that it is intelligible to the mind. If God's existence is
to be demonstrated, the mind must perceive that fact through its
experience with extramental reality. If the inner constitutive nature
of being is not given through sensory experiences, then God's
existence cannot be demonstrated. Yet the mind does perceive
through its experience of the contingency of the world that God as a
self-existent Being necessarily exists; otherwise, the world could not
exist. The mind's obvious perception of the dependency of the world
requires an infmite, self-reliant Being as its sustainer and creator. The
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contingency argument is not based on the deduction of one
proposition from another, but it is a consequence of the inner
constitutive nature of the world.'*
Yet a pure natural theology cannot demonstrate God's existence.
Etienne Gilson, who is perhaps the most significant expositor of
Thomas Aquinas in contemporary scholarship, points out that while
Greek thought provided the technique to express "ideas that had
never entered the head of any Greek philosopher, "'^ Aristotle had
taken natural theology as far as it could without reaching a true
theistic understanding. Gilson calls it "an unpalatable fact" that the
revelation of God to Moses became "an epoch-making statement in
the history of philosophy."'^ He shows that "Plato and Aristotle had
pushed their investigations almost as far as human reason alone can
take us. "18 The ultimate cause of things can only be known as a
personal God from the standpoint of the Christian revelation. For
Aquinas, there is no way one can discover the true existence of God
through reason alone.^o
Gilson shows that after Aquinas had provided the climax in the
history of natural theology, it was almost immediately followed by
an anticlimax. Why? Because metaphysics was divorced from
theology. While the existence of God should be "most obvious,"2i the
fact is no one sees it without the aid of revelation. Such a theistic idea
was never realized by Greek philosophy. Only from the Judeo-
Christian perspective does the existence of God become philo
sophically obvious. Gilson writes:
Philosophers have not inferred the supreme existentiality
of God from any previous knowledge of the existential
nature of things; on the contrary, the self-revelation of the
existentiality of God has helped philosophers toward the
realization of the existential nature of things. In other
words, philosophers were not able to reach, beyond
essences, the existential energies which are their very causes,
until the Jewish-Christian Revelation had taught them that
"to be" was the proper name of the Supreme Being. 22
The reason why natural theology fell into disrepute, Gilson says,
was because it ceased to be Christian. The post-sixteenth
philosophers (beginning with Descartes) attempted a pure natural
theology separated from the Christian religion. Gilson writes:
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"Modern philosophy has been created by laymen, not by churchmen,
and to the ends of the natural cities of men, not the end of the
supernatural city of God. "23
For Thomas Aquinas, the supreme expression of wisdom was
theology. Christian wisdom was a synthesis of revelation and human
wisdom. Descartes, on the other hand, developed his philosophy
"quite independently from his personal Christian conviction. "2*
Gilson writes: "What was new with Descartes was his actual and
practical separation of philosophical wisdom and theological
wisdom. Whereas Thomas Aquinas distinguished in order to unite,
Descartes divided in order to separate. "25 Gilson goes on to show that
Descartes wrongly believed he could prove the existence of God
"wholly separated from Christian theology . . . whom philosophy had
never been able to discover so long as it had remained foreign to the
influences of Christian revelation. "2^
Gilson further shows that Descartes' proof ofGod was not in fact a
pure natural theology despite his contention to the contrary. For
Descartes could never have affirmed so unmistakably the existence
of God had it not been for the influence of the Christian revelation
upon his philosophy. Gilson argues that the only successful natural
theology is one which, given the revelation of God, proves that His
existence is necessary from a rational consideration of the
contingency (i.e., dependency) of the world. In principle, this natural
theology done in retrospect of God's revelation is arguable with non-
theists as well, even though they may well not choose to accept it.
It is indeed surprising that protestant theology has so widely
accused Thomism of constructing a pure natural theology. As
Mascall points out, the textbook doctrine tends to be rigid in making
the distinction between the natural and the supernatural and has
been the basis in large part for this misunderstanding.27 Yet Thomist
philosophers have been insistent upon the mutuality of revelation
and reason in constructing a natural theology.
Presumably, the myth will continue to the misfortune of
protestant theology. Protestant thought has too long allowed itself to
be victimized by the subjectivism of Kantianism. The consequences
have been disastrous in many instances. Classical theological
liberalism and new-orthodoxy are two notable movements which
have had difficulty speaking biblically about God because of the
Kantian dictum that transcendent reality is incapable of being
known. Contemporary theology will continue to be fragmented into
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competing movements until the mutuality of revelation and reason is
once again recognized. Neo-Thomism can contribute to a protestant
balance between revelation and reason, if the long-standing
prejudices and misunderstandings about natural theology can be laid
aside. Otherwise, protestant theology will continue to swing from
undue emphasis on reason (liberal theology and process theology) to
an undue emphasis on revelation (neo-orthodoxy).
2. God as Dipolar
Hartshorne defines God as dipolar. The dipolar concepts include:
absolute-relative, existence-actuality, necessity-contingency,
perfection-imperfection, being-process, abstract-concrete, infinite-
finite. The latter terms in these polarities are inclusive of the former
terms which play a subordinate role. Reality is thus made up of
ultimate contraries which are brought into harmony with each other
asymmetrically. While the terms in these polarities are inter
dependent, the latter are the constituent nature of reality. This is a
reversal of the theistic position which ascribes being priority over
process.
For Hartshorne's neo-theism, process, relativity, actuality,
contingency, imperfection are interchangeable terms which are more
inclusive than the concepts of being, absolute, existence, necessity,
and perfection. He says that classical metaphysics with its
monopolar view began "the long tale of the metaphysical abuse of
Scripture" which dates back to Philo and culminated with
Augustine.28 Hartshorne believes his process philosophy which
makes God primarily relative instead of absolute now permits us to
rediscover the biblical God and the true meaning of worship.^'
Instead of a God who transcends the finite world, his concrete reality
is the actual world in its entirety. The dipolar concepts ofexistence-
actuality illustrate this definition of God. He has both existence and
actuality. His existence denotes his abstract essence; His actuality
denotes the empirical exemplification of His abstract essence (i.e.,
existence).^! God's perfect existence is a mere conceptual abstrac
tion; it refers to the inexhaustible potentialities in God. His actuality
is the ongoing series of imperfect expressions of His perfect
existence. God's imperfect actuality is thus greater than (and
inclusive of) His perfect existence.
The metaphysical necessity of God's existence is that, given the
fact of the actuality of the world, one must posit necessary existence.
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There can be no actuality without the corresponding necessity that
existence be conceived. Hartshorne sees this to be the true discovery
of Anselm's ontological argument. 32 The perfect being is one who
cannot be conceived not to exist. Anselm's mistake was to confuse
God's existence with His actuality. Instead of defining God's perfect
existence and imperfect actuality as dipolar, Anselm posited a split
between a monopolar God and the world.^^
Another set of polarities is absolute-relative. He defines the
absolute as "unrelated. "34 Yov example, in the ordinary knower-
known relationship, it is the knower who is related and the known
(e.g., a stone) that is absolute (unrelated). Theism supposedly turns
this around. God's perfection is that He is "unrelated" (absolute).
Hartshorne concludes that traditional theism really turns God into a
superobject rather than a supersubject. He is more like a superstone
than a superperson.^s Herein lies the inconsistency of theism. It
equates God's perfection with an absolute unsurpassability. While
our greatness is our ability to be related to other objects, God's
supposed greatness is His inability to be related to anything other
than Himself. Yet classical theism insists the world is related to God,
though God is not related to the world. What can be greater
"nonsense," he asks?^^
He could have been more helpful in his critique of theism if he had
pointed out the several ways the concept of the absolute has
functioned in the history of thought. First, it may refer to what is
completely unrelated (as with Hartshorne). Second, the absolute
may refer to the all-inclusive reality (pantheism). Third, the absolute
may refer to the Supreme Intelligence whose existence is necessary
but nonetheless actual and who is the creative ground of everything
else which is contingent upon His necessary existence. This is the
position of traditional theism. Since theism does not define the
absolute as does Hartshorne, there is here no logical contradiction.
3. God in Process
This new theism calls for a reorientation of God toward process
and openness to the future. Herein lies its difference from pantheism
which conceived God in terms of a monistic, static substance,
whereas panentheism (all-in-God) stresses the dipolar concepts of
reality.
A corollary to Hartshorne's panentheism is panpsychism. There is
not such thing as Wind matter. Nor is any aspect of the world without
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some degree of awareness. Awareness means mutual interaction
and freedom for everything to interrelate.^s
Freedom means there is a degree of chance inherent in the
behavior of the world. There are genuine alternatives in the world
which can be chosen freely without coercion. Freedom means to be
self-deciding and self-creating.3' It reaches its greatest expression in
God who embraces the actuality of everything past and present, as
well as the abstract possibilities of everything future. The future of
the concrete God, however, is never settled. What God's actuality
will be is contingent upon the choices of all those present living
organisms contained in His reality � from the subatomic level to the
highest level found in humankind. It can thus be seen why
Hartshorne says process is the fundamental concept of panentheism
rather than the notion of being. It can also be seen why he labels his
panentheism a surrelativism. God is Surrelative (i.e., the supremely
relative).*�
Hartshorne believes his quasi-theism is a more accurate reading of
Holy Scripture than traditional theism. In the light of its
insurmountable logical difficulties, Hartshorne thinks theists have
no other alternative than to adopt his proposal.*' If God is to be
worshiped, then God must be a God in process, not a static, unrelated
Monarchical-like Being.
Hartshorne fails to see that process is also a fundamental idea in
traditional theism. While Greek metaphysics defined being in a
static manner, traditional theism, represented by Augustine and
Aquinas, did not. Aquinas redefined ultimate being as self-existing
(acting) being. Gilson shows that Aquinas defined existence as
dynamic activity (becoming). But God's becoming is not a finite
becoming in which God changes from one state to another. The
notion of activity is not identical in meaning to changing.
Hartshorne's metaphysics confuses these terms.
In his exposition of Karl Barth's doctrine of God, Eberhard
Jiingel shows that God's being is in becoming. But God's becoming
does not mean finite movement in which God's existence is altered.
God's eternal becoming is the motion of love within his truine
Being.*2
The God of Aquinas is Pure Act. Activity and energy within the
divine being are fundamental. The biblical history of revelation
substantiates this affirmation that God is one who acts (cf G. Ernest
Wright, The God Who Acts).
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A weakness of the Augustinian definition of God is the Platonic
philosophy of essentialism in which God is primary defined in terms
of ideas (essences) rather than concrete existence. While he certainly
affirmed the dynamic reality of God and thus radically modified the
Platonic notion of static substance, Augustine's reliance upon
essentialism worked against the biblical insight that God is
fundamentally one who is a self-existing being who acts with
decisiveness.
Nevertheless, Augustine's substantialism was modified by his
stress upon the relational concept of God's triune being. As
Christopher Stead points out, Augustine's term for God was
"substantial relations. '"?^ Hence process in God is fundamental for
Augustine. God is Father by virtue of His dynamic relation to the
Son. The Son is Son by virtue of his relation to the Father. The Holy
Spirit is the dynamic union of Father and Son. In this way,
Augustine affirms God's infinite being, while preserving His living,
dynamic reality.
The Eastern Church spoke of the divine procession. God is in
eternal process within Himself. The Father begets the Son, and the
Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son (as formulated by
Western Christianity). This notion of process is an infinite actual
process which does not involve an alteration in God's infinite being.
To be sure, finite process does involve change. But if God is an
infinite being who has actualized all possibilities, then process within
His divine reality does not imply finite changes.
Hartshorne's use of process harks back beyond the traditional
theism of Augustine and Aquinas to classical Greek philosophy in
which essence is a static notion. Hartshorne defines the essence of
ultimate reality as a mere abstract, logical notion which lacks
dynamic actuality. But if God is a personal Creator ex nihilo who is
"a pure Act of Existing," then the infinite process within His divine
being cannot be prejudged on the basis of our finite process.
Hartshorne's metaphysics suffers from his not discussing the issue of
process as formulated in traditional theism. He rather generally
states that theism is riddled with logical confusion because he
assumes that actuality always infers finiteness, while the concept of
being always infers static sameness.
While Greek thought defined being in static terms of substance,
Aquinas defined God's being in dynamic terms of existence ("pure
Act of Existing").** That is why R.G. CoUingwood says Aquinas
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altogether eliminated the Greek notion of substance with his
definition of God as Pure Act.*' This is also why Gilson calls
Thomism an existential philosophy as opposed to an essentialist
philosophy. Gilson writes that for Aquinas "existence is not a thing,
but the act that causes a thing both to be and to be what it is."*^
While Hartshorne is right to insist upon process in God, it is a non
sequitur that process necessarily involves finite changing. God's
existence is not an abstraction, but is His freedom to act, even as
human existence is one's freedom to act. For humans, to exist is a
finite becoming of one's true essence, whereas for God His existence
is identical to His essence. His essence is a pure Act of Existing.
4. The Mystery of God
A fundamental implication of God's mystery in traditional theism
is His ontological distinction from the created order of being. What
emerges from this polarity of God and the world, Hartshorne says, is
a third reality: "So it seems that the total reality is World-and-God, a
whole of which both creator and creatures are constituents. This
whole is neither God nor world but a third entity ofwhich no account
is given us in the system" of traditional theism.*'
Hartshorne introduces an illicit meaning into the word, God, here.
One cannot add God and the world together because they are
different categories. God is not one more numerical finite entity
alongside which other entities in the created world can be added
together. The idea ofa third entity, God-and-the-world, which would
be greater than either God or the world, is a logical impossibility for
a God who is infinite being, though it would be true of a finite God.
Corresponding to Hartshorne's denial ofGod's self-existence is his
rejection of creatio ex nihilo. He says this doctrine arises from a
"dubious interpretation" of an "obscure parable" in Genesis.*^
Though the Hebraic mindset was not metaphysically oriented, there
is no intrinsic reason why the Bible could not be restated in the new
cultural thought-patterns of Hellenism. In fact, this process was
already begun in the New Testament. It is curious that after
Hartshorne has blamed traditional theism for its "metaphysical
abuse" of Scripture that he appeals to the Bible for support of his
own process metaphysics, as if in his case the Bible does speak
metaphysically.*'
The doctrine of ex nihilo is implicit in the Bible. It became
normative in later Judaism. The first clear statement of creatio ex
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nihilo is II Maccabees 7:28, but as Edmond Jacob says, this doctrine
"was the only possible issue [inference] from the thought of the Old
Testament, "50 As Yehezkel Kaufmann points out, in the Old
Testament "this principle is not yet made exphcit." He further writes:
"Yet the role of the tohu wabohu is quite unlike the past played by the
primeval matter of pagan cosmogonies, God creates the cosmic
phenomena of light, firmament, sun, moon, and host of heaven by
fiat alone, with no recourse to primeval stuff,"" This doctrine
implicit in the Old Testament became normative in Judaism ofJesus'
day. It is echoed in certain New Testament passages as Romans 4: 17,
Hebrews 11:3, and II Peter 3:5, Hartshorne is out of step with the
consensus of biblical scholars in this regard. Nor does his
panentheistic idea have truly biblical foundation. Kaufmann writes:
"The pagan idea that the deity derives power and benefit from certain
objects and substances is entirely absent in the Bible. "52
The thrust of Paul's argument to the men of Athens on the
Areopagus was the cosmological transcendence of God's being. In
contrast to the polj^heistic inclusion of the gods within the world
(which is not altogether unlike the more sophisticated panentheism
of Hartshorne), Paul says:
The God who made the world and everything in it, being
Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in shrines made by
man, nor is He served by human hands, as though He
needed anything, since He Himself gives to all men life and
breath and everything (Acts 17:24-25).
Kaufmann further writes of the Old Testament: "Theogony makes
the birth of the gods part of the eternal, self-operating process of
becoming that governs the universe. Hence the gods ... are subject to
a succession of ages." On the other hand, "the biblical god, however,
is outside of the flux of becoming and change. "53
For Hartshorne to contend otherwise is to go against well-
established results of biblical exegesis. Hartshorne's panentheistic
reduction of God's being to finite process and relativity is a reverting
back to the paganism rejected by the Bible. Panentheism is turning
God the Creator into a naturalistic deity who is a creature (Romans
1:25). The God of the Bible is the living God of creation, the
sovereign Lord of history, and His nature is invisible and spiritual
(John 4:24; Romans 1:20). The inescapable conviction of the Bible is
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that God is personal though distinct from His creation, and He enters
into relation with His creatures freely, while at the same time
maintaining His separate, determinate individuality. Hartshorne's
neo-theism lacks an appreciation for this quality ofmystery in God's
infinite being.
5. The Possibility of God-Talk
Hartshorne's finite God does not tell us something about Himself
because He lacks concrete personality. He argues that the personal
God of traditional theism also could not talk to His creatures because
the idea of an infinite being would logically exclude His relatedness
to the world.'*
The Christian theist chooses a different approach than Hartshorne's.
Not only does the Bible preserve a balance between God's infinite
mystery and His revelation in history, philosophical considerations
substantiate that talk about an infinite God is a possibility.
The basic metaphysical attribute of God is being. Being as such is
not a genus, but it is what embraces everything as Aristotle
maintained. All God-talk in traditional theism presupposes that
being is fundamental both for God and humans. The classical
biblical text which illustrates this metaphysical conviction is in
Exodus 3:14, where God declares his name to Moses: "I am who I
am." The writer to the Hebrews also says the fundamental thing
about belief in God is "that He is" (Hebrews 11:6). The "I am"
statements of Jesus contained in John's Gospel also reflect the "I am"
of Exodus 3:14.
Since being is not a finite category as such but a quality ofall levels
of reality, traditional theism avoids the charge that its God is wholly
other. In this respect, the imago dei doctrine (Genesis 1:27) is a
fundamental premise for making theological assertions.
The Thomist doctrine of the analogy of being is helpful here. One
can make assertions about God, but they are analogical. Since God
and humans are rational beings, communication can take place. But
since God is infinite being and humans are finite beings, we can only
understand what transcends our being analogically. Analogical
language is not equivocal since we do have being in common with
God, though unlike the divine being our being is dependent being.
Nor is analogical language univocal, for finite beings do not possess
being in exactly the same way the divine being does. Nonetheless,
finite beings can know what the infinite being reveals in a positive
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way about Himself since there is a hierarchy ofbeing in which finite
persons share being in common with God. Hence talk about God is a
rational possibility.
Hartshorne may reject the notion of a complex hierarchical view
of reality. He may opt for a "one-storied" universe. He may require
that reality should be talked about univocally and literally, but in so
doing, he obscures the spiritual uniqueness of human beings and the
transcendence of God.
6. God's Power and Evil
Hartshorne's God is not an actual person who bears responsibility
for the "why" of creation.'' Evil is a necessary implication of the
freedom of the world, and God exercises persuasive (not coercive)
power in influencing (but not dictating) the world.'^
Traditional theism is allegedly unnecessarily burdened with an
insoluable problem in understanding freedom and evil because it
holds God responsible for creating ex nihilo and ascribes to Him a
"sheer monopoly" of power." Evil allegedly makes sense in
panentheism because the world is free ofdivine coercion and because
God is not the cause of things.'* If God is the metaphysical cause of
things, God's goodness is called into question.
The hidden premise in this ancient objection to theism is that
reality ought to be simple, but this is just where its inadequacy lies.
Reality is far more complex than atheism or panentheism will allow.
There are no easy answers in regard to the twistedness of the world.
The sin of the world cost something also for God � the death of His
Son. He could not simply whitewash the wrongs in the world. To do
so would be to undermine His own morality. Not even an all-
powerful God who has created persons with moral freedom can act
capriciously, as if He had exclusive monopoly on power. But He can
act graciously and lovingly. This is the significance of the incarnation
� the divine person, the God-man, took upon Himself the pain and
suffering of the world. The morality of God is vindicated, not by
some capricious act in which He simply overcame and overruled
finite freedom, but by His becoming finite in Jesus of Nazareth.
(Notice that becoming, process, is at the heart of the doctrine of the
incarnation).
To demand of God that He annihilate tragedy and sin if He is all-
powerful is to misunderstand the meaning of divine power in
traditional theism. It is to make Him a capricious Superman who
32
The Panentheism of Charles Hartshorne: A Critique
defies the laws of His own moral being. For God to create persons
with finite freedom implies the possibility of choosing evil. Edward
Madden and Peter Hare in their classical treatment of the theistic
problem with evil have shown that some evil is logically compatible
with the notion of God's sovereignty and love. Their reservations
about theism are not based on a logical contradiction in theism, but
on the apparently gratuitous nature of evil and its unjust dis
tribution.'' Yet, is not the extensive twistedness of the world a
possible implication of moral irresponsibility? Paul even shows that
the entire creation travails in the pain of the consequences of human
sin. Because of the interrelatedness and solidarity of humanity and
because of the intrinsic relatedness of humanity with nature, all
creation suffers evil as a result of human irresponsibility (Romans
8:18-23).
Unlike Hartshorne's view in which evil is largely explained away
since no personal God is responsible for creation as such, traditional
theism recognizes the tragedy of evil for what it really is � a
consequence of wrong human choices. The tragedy of evil is in its
fundamental sense that it was not necessary for wrong choices to be
made (even though the possibility of wrong choices necessarily
coexisted with the fact of freedom). Because of the intrinsic
relatedness of humanity and creation, evil appears gratuitous and
unjust in its distribution in the sense that evil extensively blights the
whole world.
God had no ultimate reason for evil existing in the world. There is
not some hidden plan He has for the world in this regard. What we
view as tragedy is so for God. Ultimately, God will redeem the world
and tragedy will be overcome through our choices to accept His
redeemed humanity in Jesus Christ. This is why the eschatological
hope of the Christian is an essential part of his faith in God.
The doctrine of original sin assumes the gratuitous nature of evil.
But, as Mascall writes: "The doctrine of original sin is a cheerful
doctrine, for it assures us that the sad condition in which we find
ourselves is not the condition for which we are made and that by the
grace of God we can be delivered from it."^
So radical is the Christian understanding of the terrible
imphcations of free will that it allows for the real possiblity that
tragedy may not be overcome altogether. It is entirely possible that
some through their moral rejection of God's grace may find
themselves eternally outside the Kingdom of God. It has been
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suggested that the highest compUment given to human beings by God
is to allow them to choose their eternal destiny.^i
This concept of the eternal loss of the self seems difficult to accept.
We might well wonder why God made human beings knowing in
advance the abuse to be made of freedom. Why would God create if
evil would become so gratuitous and terrible in its consequences?
There is no reason which we as finite beings can give. The theist
chooses to let an infinite, wise God be God in this decision of His to
create. Of course the believer affirms that God's will is in accord with
his rationaUty and morality. Yet it will not help in the final analysis to
argue with Leibniz that this is the best of all possible worlds. This is
simply the world God freely choose to create. To demand that we
fully know the reasons why God created is existentially under
standable, but philosophically unproductive. Is the gratuitous nature
of evil worth the price of creation? God thinks so, even if we think
not.
Nontheists may think this insoluble problem makes theism
unacceptable, but the theist is still free to argue that nontheists do not
make the problem of evil any more palatable (especially since they
offer no hope for deliverance). Nor do they offer alternatives which
escape any less serious logical and existential difficulties, especially
as it can be seen in the self-contradiction of the nontheist's
assumption that there is no moral reason for things existing while
morally arguing against the immorality of the world. One cannot
simultaneously argue against the idea of the ultimate morality of the
world while assuming the objectivity of his own moral insight. If
there is no moral reason inherent in the being of the world, there can
be no persuasiveness to the particularistic judgment of a nontheist
who claims he possesses moral insight into why God cannot exist.
The nontheist cannot have it both ways. If there is no inherent moral
reason to the being of the world, then he should be unable to see any
problem at all with regard to evil. A problem of evil is a problem for
the traditional theist, but the nontheist from the outset has excluded
himself from even discussing the issue by the nature of his own
postulates.
A similar difficulty obtains for panentheism. Hartshorne assumes
a moral and rational structure inherent in the world, but he denies
there is any moral reason why there is anything at all. Morality is an
irrational given; it is altogether unaccounted for. Especially God is
not morally responsible for the cause of the world. A theist will argue
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that if there is no rationale for finite rationality itself then morality
and rationality are indistinguishable from arbitrariness. Moral
reasoning is simply reduced to individual caprice, and any attempt to
construct meaning and value is illicit from the outset.
Even if there is a real element of chance (arbitrariness) in reality
(the Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy), the scientist and the
philosopher still assume the priority of rational structure over
arbitrariness. Unless reality is predictable in accord with reason, then
life will be disrupted and all theoretical constructs will collapse. For
truth depends upon the principle of rational explanation. Yet how
can one explain the principle of rationality itself? If we assume
reasons can be given for everything (even to acknowledge irrational
behavior depends on rational insight), then are we not compelled to
assume that finite rationality itself must be accounted for?
Hartshorne says not. He makes contingency the basis of every-
thing.62 Hence the self-cancellation of his panentheism. He has no
apparent theoretical basis upon which to construct any theory of
truth or morality, if irrational causes account for the being of the
world. How there can be any logical reasoning at all if there is no
ultimate reason why there is something rather than sheer nothing is
not explained. Whitehead's labeling this difficulty "the ultimate
limitation" and "the ultimate irrationality"^^ indicates the
panentheistic failure to account for the validity of logical thinking.
These labels do not theoretically justify logical reasoning any more
than does Bertrand Russell's nontheistic attempt to justify belief in
inductive reasoning through what he calls "induction by enumera
tion." He frankly admits that how one can justify the validity of
reasoning "remains unsolved to this day."^* The theist is able to see in
these concessions traces of sheer fideism.
The panentheistic insight that God's existence is the principle of
rationality is thus weakened by its equating God's actuality with
contingency. If the reason for anything concretely existing is
irrational, then upon what philosophical basis can reason be relied
upon at all � other than blind faith? Irrationality and rationality
become indistinguishable.
It seems apparent that the nontheistic and panentheistic objection
to belief in a personal self-existent Being, who is all-powerful and
good, is too easy. For there can be no true moral reasoning without
the presuppositions of traditional theism which provides the only
basis for assuming the validity of rationality and morality, as the
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Thomist tradition has always maintained. While evil may be an
insoluble problem for the theist, the more fundamental problem of
reasoning at all is an insoluble problem for the nontheist and
panentheist. What is metaphysically needed, as Kant put it, is a
Supreme Intelligence who alone can "render the existence of the
contingent . . . comprehensible. "^5 Otherwise, one falls into "the
narrowing assertions of materialism, of naturalism, and of
fatalism. "^6
Though the theistic position poses a problem for itself, one's faith
in God does enable one to face the future with hope, even if the "why"
of gratuitous evil and its unjust distribution cannot be silenced. The
reason for this hope is grounded in the fact of the sufferings of God in
Christ. To be sure, Hartshorne also speaks of God suffering. If God
lacks a conscious, subjective awareness of emotions, there is little
comfort in the panentheistic identification of God with the world.
God in Christian theism suffers in Jesus Christ. God is affectional in
His being, and because He is an infmite, intelligent Being, the
intensity of His pain surpasses all Umits of human anguish. This
notion of a hurting God who has suffered in Jesus Christ shows the
extent of His emotional involvement with creation. His suffering is a
testimony that God is doing everything that an all-loving, all-
powerful God can do to save the world, given the context of human
freedom and morality.^'
To be sure, God's perfect being is not altered through His openness
to the world and His emotional involvement with us. Yet God is truly
affectionate and is consciously aware of His and our emotions. The
error of Patripassianism is not that it taught that God's being
included pathos, but that God was capable of being changed in His
essence by finite persons. The idea of impassibility in traditional
theism in this regard is misleading for us today since passion no
longer means being acted upon and changed. Passion for us denotes
the idea of emotional involvement.
7. Reality as Personal
The basic philosophical objection to Hartshorne's process
metaphysics is that it de-personalizes reality. His conception of the
world harks back to the early Greeks, such as Empedocles, who
describes the essence of the world as love (attraction) and hate
(strife).^^ Love and hate are metaphysical abstract essences, not
characteristics of free intelligences. That is, love is not primarily
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associated with a conscious subjective knowledge of one's emotions,
but is an abstract principle.
Hartshorne defines love as "sympathetic participation." That is,
the actual world is the sympathetic (i.e., interdependent) participa
tion of all its parts in each other.^' Love is not primarily an affective
relationship between intelligent persons, but is rather a mutual
association of the particulars of reality. Love is more of a principle
than a personal response.
Freedom is de-personalized in its primary signification and re
interpreted as a cosmological principle of chance inherent in all
reality from the molecular level up to the actual whole of the world.
To be sure, it is not sheer chance for Hartshorne, but the principle of
indeterminacy is where his emphasis lies.'�
Knowledge is also de-personalized in the primary sense of the
word to mean ontological relatedness, not critical reflection.'' He
asks: "What is concrete knowledge ... if not some kind of
sympathetic participation or love?"'^ Love, knowledge, sympathetic
participation are more or less interchangeable terms to designate an
impersonal principle of interdependence, mutual association, and
inclusiveness.
The concept of awareness is also de-personalized. "Awareness is
essentially a response, an adaptation to others. "^^ Also, "personality"
is de-personalized. "And what is 'personality' but an enduring
individual character or essence in a flux of such responses?"'*
Personality means the "character" ofGod (i.e.. His abstract essence).
It refers to "the mere universal divine outline of existence without
concrete or particular content" and as such "is indeed empty.""
Personality denotes primarily the social relations of all concrete
entities. Personality thus no longer carries with it a common sense
definition of meaning an individual rational being.'^
Awareness means the "act" of God. To say God acts is to say he
"responds." This responsiveness in God is the primary feature of the
relative, concrete aspect of God. "Personality" is the primary feature
of the absolute, non-actual aspect of his reality. It is the personality
of God which is metaphysically, eternally enduring, but it is His
awareness that is empirically changing. Personality is only a
metaphysical abstraction, lacking actual intelligence. Awareness
means the empirical relatedness of everything. It specifically has no
connotation of psychological self-awareness which is a characteristic
of determinate beings with intelligence.
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What Hartshorne is asking us to see is that every part of reality
from the molecular level up to the actual whole of reality (God-and-
the world) is self-deciding, knowing, loving, responding, while
stripping all these terms of their commonsense, personalistic
meanings. In this respect, Hartshorne has more aptly called his
panentheism a neo-Buddhism.''
His neo-Buddhism is further seen in the way he defines human
beings as changing individuals who lack any enduring self-identity.
Here we come close to the notion of absolute change, that nothing
endures except that the present does somehow include the past,
though what is present is not the past reality as such. The only
enduring event is the specious present.'^
How is it possible to defend this notion of absolute change in
which nothing endures? Paul Tillich has shown the inadequacy of
this idea:
The first thing to be emphasized is that human nature could
not change if there was not something unchangeable in it.
This is easy to understand: absolute change is an impossible
notion, because without a subject of which we can say that it
changes we neither could notice nor measure a change.''
Hartshorne refuses the force of this telling criticism of his process
metaphysics. He in turn accuses Tillich of falling into Eleaticism
because he makes being, not process, the key ontological concept.*"
For Hartshorne, only love impersonally conceived as the dynamic
interrelation of all things is the enduring quality of reality. God is the
greatest exemplification of love, for he is the integration of all
actualities, though he undergoes a "multiplicity of states."
Hartshorne says this means the God I "worship" is not your God.
Neither do I worship the same God now that I did a moment ago.*'
Why? Because He is always changing in His actuality, though His
love (i.e., that quality which binds reality together) guarantees the
unity and harmony of the world. The Christian theists might be led to
think this notion ofmany "gods" is only a more sophisticated form of
polytheism.
It is apparent that love in its primary signification does not mean a
self-conscious emotion between persons. To be sure, Hartshorne
does say only men worship (i.e., praise God) because he alone has
intelligence enough to speak. *2 But what does it mean to praise God if
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He has no determinate knowledge of our acts of worship?Worship is
de-personaUzed to mean a verbal response on our part to something
which cannot know what we are saying.
According to its commonsense meaning, to be a person is to be a
determinate being with free intelligence. Hartshorne denies that God
is a person in the sense of "a single determinate actuality. He is a
person in the analogical sense that he, like men, is a unified and
integrated being.** His difference from us is that he is "absolutely
cosmic or universal in his capacities interacting with all others."*'
Hartshorne rejects what he calls a "substance theory of personality"
in favor of "the Buddhist-Whiteheadean or event theory" according
to which "an existing person [whether divine or human] is a sequence
of actualities, several per second presumably."*^
For Christian theism, this is the fatal flaw in Hartshorne's
panentheism. What sense does it make to say that reality is a process
actualizing its meaning if reahty is de-personalized? What sense can
be made of a panpsychist contention that atoms strive, decide, create,
love, know, if they are devoid of free intelligence?*' Are not such
qualities exclusively the possession of determinate beings with
inteUigence? Even allowing for the quantum theory of physics which
says there is chance in the very structure of reality, there is no reason
why we should anthropomorphize atoms. Even though Hartshorne
claims his panpsychist metaphysics is the most intelligible
alternative, it is difficult to avoid the impression that it is an
abstraction unrelated to real life, especially because it de
personalizes reality.
Herein lies the most glaring parodox in his thought. The concrete
God is the all-embracing actuality, but for whom is the concrete God
an actuality? For Himself? No, because He is not a je(/"-conscious
living mind who has a determinate knowledge of Himself For man?
No, because there is no way any person can embrace in the mind the
comprehensive whole of reality. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that Hartshorne's concrete God is an abstraction. A commonsense
concept of personality requires us to think of ideas as belonging to a
living self-conscious mind. Values are nothing if they do not belong
to someone. Hartshorne implicitly admits this when he acknowledges
that the concrete God after man's disappearance from the world may
include everything "faintly and ineffectively."** Why? Because God's
existence is not an actual intelligent being. To locate "ideas" and
"values" within the empirical world apart from any association with
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an actual intelligence is finally to de-personalize the meaning of ideas
and values. In his criticism of humanism, Hartshorne rejects this
exclusiveness of values to rational beings as a deification of
humanity.*' But it seems his thought has fallen into the opposite
error of anthropomorphizing the world.
Hartshorne's reduction of reality to the relative world leads to a
further reservation about his panentheism. He seems to have no
vision ofmystery. There is no allowance in his system for what Tillich
calls the abysmal nature of reality, or what Michael Novak calls the
experience of nothingness.'" Hartshorne's rationalistic emphasis
upon the meaningfulness of reality ignores the gnawing suspicion
that there is an unknowable element about ultimate reality which
engulfs us and threatens us. Tillich's panentheism interprets this
abysmal nature of reality as the unknowable depth of reality which
points to the unchangeableness of God as Being-itself" Existen
tialists, like Sartre and Camus, interpret this feeling ofnothingness as
an ontological vacuum in man's being. For them, nothingness is
unknowable because nothing is there to be known. Hartshorne has
no place in his philosophy for this experience of non-being. There is
also a corresponding neglect in his panentheism concerning the
feeling of anxiety and ambiguity of life. To say that the "essence of
God is philosophically explicable and knowable"'^ is to say nothing
is left unexplained about ultimate reality. If one knows the very
essence of God, then one is not estranged from God. There is then no
divine mystery, no grace, no sin, and that feeling of twistedness of the
world and the threat of the Unknown are simply explained away.
It becomes easy to see why Hartshorne disallows subjective
immortality.'^ His philosophy remains within the ordinary view of
human experience with no properties lying outside. There is nothing
more to reality. This emphasis upon the universality of truth has the
advantage of claiming objectivity for itself, but it has the
disadvantage of undermining the significance of the individual with
his passionate interest in eternal happiness which transcends the
specious present. It can thus be said Hartshorne has de-personalized
immortality, for "we are ephemeral, but immortally so, for nothing
escapes being woven into the imperishable and living texture of
deity.""* Hartshorne objects to the charge this makes the concept of
immortality "impersonal."" He asks: "What is personal if not an
actual human life from birth to death? It is that which is everlastingly
cherished. "'6 But what sense does it make to say a concrete God who
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has no determinate intelligence "cherishes" our life from its birth to
death in His eternal life? And is not the notion of an individual who is
"cherished" forever meaningless at least for the individual, if he has
no subjective existence in the hfe hereafter?
Kierkegaard's criticism of the HegeUan "concrete universal" seems
applicable to Hartshorne: "What happens to the individual is in the
last analysis a matter of indifference. "9'
8. Hartshorne's Panentheism and Christian Theology
Obviously many of Hartshorne's concerns overlap with Christian
faith, and some Christian theologians believe his categories are easily
adapted theologically for interpreting the gospel to the contem
porary mind. Most notably among those who think this way is
Hartshorne's former student and distinguished professor at
Claremont School of Theology, John. B. Cobb, Jr. Whether or not
his attempt to provide this synthesis is successful merits considera
tion, but a full discussion of this question lies outside the scope of this
present essay.
However, Cobb's adaptation of process philosophy to Christian
faith is suspect from the beginning for several reasons, if finite
process is posited as the fundamental feature of God's actuality.
First, God can give us no "absolute" or "provisional" guarantee that
good will triumph over evil,'* despite Jesus' promise of the coming
Kingdom. If God is subject to finite process, then He too can be
victimized by evil and cannot promise us with certainty the arrival of
the New Jerusalem.
Second, Cobb, unlike Hartshorne, does allow for the possibility of
life hereafter, though he is unsure about its reality and is not overly
concerned about it." His ambivalence stems in part from the
panentheistic denial that persons possess enduring spiritual self-
identity. Human beings are a sequence of momentary events who
come to an end at their physical death. Paul thought differently
about this. If we are imprisoned in the finite process with no spiritual
transcendence and with no hope beyond this present world, Paul felt
life was meaningless here and now. Without the eschatological hope,
preaching is pointless, faith is empty, and existence is regrettable (I
Cor. 15:14, 19).
Third, God's reduction to finite process calls into question His
deity. Unlike Hartshorne, Cobb's Christian convictions cause him to
ascribe personal self-awareness to God.'"" Yet His self-awareness is
41
The Asbury Seminarian
limited by the finite process. Particularly, God does not know the
future. If God is a self-knowing mind who does not transcend the
relativities of this worldly process and who has no comprehensive
knowledge of future reality, then one cannot help but wonder if God
does not feel the insecurity and anxiety of this Unknown Future,
What is to keep us from thinking God "deifies" this Unknown even as
man's anxiety about the future has been the occasion for his
"anthropomorphizing" his experience of the Unknown? Despite his
impersonal notion of being, Tillich's criticism of Bergson's process
thought seems incontrovertible at this point.
A God who is not able to anticipate every possible future is
dependent on an absolute accident and cannot be the
foundation of an ultimate courage. This God would Himself
be subject to the anxiety of the unknown, . , , On the other
hand, without that which limits openness, history would be
without direction. It would cease to be history, 'O'
How finite process as the basic attribute of reality can be
harmonized with Christian faith is impossible to know. For it gives
us no security about the triumph of good over evil; it minimizes the
significance of the eternal happiness of individuals; and it weakens
faith ("ultimate courage") in God since He Himself is "subject to the
anxiety of the unknown."
The religious implications of Hartshorne's metaphysics are in
many respects negative from the standpoint of traditional theism, as
Hartshorne intended. It denies otherworldly realities. It denies the
history of salvation. It denies the special revelation ofultimate reality
(a personal God) in history. It denies that anything absolutely unique
can happen in history. It is a denial of the Incarnation. '"^ it is a
rejection of the normative authority of the Bible, for the Bible can
teach us nothing about the essence of anything which is not already
exemplified in ordinary human experience.'"* The Bible as a record
of God speaking and acting in history is decided against in favor of a
philosophy which stresses universal principles for "which factual
distinctions are neutral."'"' Nothing historically factual is then of any
consequence to Hartshorne's quasi-theism. Hartshorne's metaphysics
minimizes the significance of the affectional nature of truth, as if the
conscious subjective awareness of human emotion is not the core of
personality. Hence worship of God as personal devotion is de-
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personalized into an aesthetic, intellectual exercise. Lacking the
personal dimension, Hartshorne's theism has more aptly been called
a quasi-theism.'"^
Yet Hartshorne impressively shows that a positivistic narrowing
down of truth to mere empirical facts is a retreating from the
philosophical responsibility of addressing reality as such. He
demonstrates that human experience cannot successfully evade the
fact of God's existence. He rightly contends that any meaningful
notion of God includes His involvement in time and that His
relationship to the world is grounded in the fact of divine energy and
activity. He rightly argues against a deterministic model of reality,
showing that freedom is a characteristic of the world because it is a
fundamental attribute of God. His rejection of a Kantian bifurcated
world in which only the appearance (phenomena) of reality
(noumena) is knowable is a move in the right direction if a wholistic
perspective of reality is to be maintained. Over against atheism,
humanism, and deism, Hartshorne seeks to show that the values
which give meaning to the whole of creation are grounded in the
immanent activity of God's concrete actuality. Whether or not his
quasi-theism is more adequate than traditional theism for
interpreting reality is a decision each person must make for oneself.
For truth, though it is an intellectual activity, is a moral decision.
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The Divine Inspiration ofHoly Scripture, by William J. Abraham.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, 126 pp., $27.95.
This book, by a 1973 graduate of Asbury Theological Seminary,
has a number of features to its credit. Above all of these is its
seriousness of purpose. Dr. Abraham wishes to restore evangelical
theology to a place of importance in Christian thought which he
believes its current theories of inspiration prevent it from taking.
Along with this he wishes to make it possible for those who are
convinced of the results of higher critical studies to retain a high view
of the Scripture's authority in matters of faith and practice. To
do these, the author has applied his considerable intellect and
training to breaking new ground. He has not been willing merely to
defend or criticize the old, but has sought to discover new paths
which will lead beyond what he considers to be the present impasse.
In all this, he seeks to be very honest about his origins and his
concerns; there is no hidden agenda in the book. For all these he
deserves warm praise.
The thesis of the book is rather simple and may be covered in four
points: 1) all present theories of inerrancy or verbal inspiration are,
despite their formulators' earnest claims to the contrary, only
another version of the now-repudiated dictation theory; 2) attempts
to state a theory of inspiration which will be more reflective of
current understandings of the Bible are inadequate because they
continue to consider inspiration as a facet of divine speaking; 3) the
solution is to consider inspiration as a relational term on the analogy
of its most common current usage: the student was inspired by the
teacher. Thus the Scriptures are the result of divine inspiration, but
that inspiration is not a guarantee of the accuracy of their content. To
be sure, it favors that accuracy, especially in regard to the spirit of
what is said, but it does not guarantee it; 4) the Scriptures' statements
concerning their origin more nearly point to this view of inspiration
than to verbal or plenary inspiration.
I approached the book with considerable anticipation. I was hoping
for something which would make the orthodox understanding of the
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Scriptures' origin clearer and more communicable. Unfortunately
that is not the case. The author has abandoned that understanding,
while claiming that that abandonment does not significantly alter the
understanding that the Bible is (is the result of?) special revelation.'
Whether he understands the radical nature of his proposal is not
clear. However, as he admits, orthodoxy has for 20 centuries directly
linked divine speaking and inspiration, largely in an understood, but
undeveloped, theory of dictation. While on one hand he claims
the fundamentalists could not support their claim of unity with the
early church because they departed from dictation, on the other hand
he claims they really did not depart! Surely both cannot be correct.
But in either case the understanding that inspiration relates to divine
speaking is clear. Thus Dr. Abraham, in saying that there is no such
relation, has not merely modified the orthodox view, but abandoned
it. This raises the question about the hallmarks of evangelicalism to
which we will return at the end of this essay.
While many of the individual elements of the book are helpful, it
seems to me that there is room for considerable doubt concerning
each point in his argument. First of all, as noted above, the
fundamentalists cannot have both departed and not departed from
the early church's point of view. In fact, I think it may be argued that
they remained in essential agreement with the early church while
clarifying and correcting its point of view. At the same time it may be
admitted that their attempt to lodge infallibility in the autographs
becomes a self-defeating step. Understood in their own milieu and in
the light of their own purposes, the Scriptures are as infallible today
as they ever were.
Second, modern attempts to modify the view of inspiration have
not failed because they continue to link inspiration and divine
speaking, but because they separate inspiration and revelation, just
as Dr. Abraham seems to be doing.2 Unless God has disclosed
himself in ways which are accessible to the cognitive mind (and how
else than through language?), it becomes m.eaningless to speak of
inspiration. A sunset may be inspiring, but it is not profitable for
reproof, correction, or instruction in righteousness. There must be
reliable cognitive communication. But if it is granted that no reliable,
cognitive communication took place in the origination of Scripture,
inspiration is very quickly drained of any significance.
That leads directly into the third point: can inspiration be limited
to mere relational impact with accuracy of content only a likely
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corollary? Frankly, this is the weakest part of the book. The analyses
of the various attempts to frame acceptable theories of inspiration
are penetrating and well-argued, although those of the fundamen
talists seem to be marked by an often condescending tone. By contrast.
Dr. Abraham's presentation of his own theory is much less incisive.
He seems content to present and explain his teacher-student analogy,
but without the intense kind of argumentation such a radically new
theory would seem to require. He does not seem to anticipate his
opponents' arguments nor defend his idea against them.^
In fact, to suggest that inspiration can be separated from divine
speaking is a radically new idea which needs a great deal of defense.
As Barr has pointed out, if the Bible is about anything, it is about
divine speaking. Not that alone to be sure, but it w about that. If that
is so, the first issue is: did He speak? The second issue is: do we know
what He said? The third issue is: do we have an accurate record of
what He said? The orthodox church has answered all of these with a
firm yes. And when it was asked why it affirmed these, its answer was
that God had breathed the Scriptures. Whatever "inspire" may mean
today is of little relevance to the way it was used in the biblical
context.* We are not told that the biblical writers were so inspired by
their encounters with God that they wrote their perceptions of His
nature. The Bible says God breathed the Scriptures. That does not
reduce us to dictation, but it does tell us that God spoke through the
prophets.
Fourth, Dr. Abraham's treatment of the Scriptures regularly
adduced to support verbal inspiration is more satisfying, but
somewhat flawed in that whenever the texts would seem to say more
than he wishes them to, he concludes that the speaker is merely
appealing to the traditional Jewish understanding. It is one thing to
say this of an off-handed statement like "Moses says." It is quite
another when the very basis of a given appeal is that every part of the
Scripture is from God.
Finally, we must address the question of the meaning of
"evangelical." It is hardly merely "non-Roman Catholic" as the
author suggests it meant in Reformation times. What it meant then,
it also meant in the Evangelical Revival in England and to the early
fundamentalists. Evangelicalism is about the evangel, the good news
of salvation by grace through faith in the atoning efficacy of Christ's
death as taught by the Scriptures. Thus, it is no accident that Luther
and Wesley were both so committed to the authority of the text as it
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stands. They saw what the fundamentaUsts of the late 19th and early
20th centuries saw � unless the Scriptures can be taken at face value,
there is no evangel. The view that Jesus Christ's death and
resurrection make possible fellowship with God in this life and the
next is wholly dependent for its survival upon a Bible whose content
stems ultimately from God. Dr. Abraham says this is the counsel of
fear. That is not so. It is the counsel of the history of the last century.
However devout and godly such men as Robertson Smith and
Charles Briggs may have been, it is not their descendants who now
people even our liberal pulpits and seminaries. It is those who at least
began their pilgrimage as the descendants of Warfield, Steele,
Machen, and Orr.
Footnotes
'I predict that non-evangelicals as well as evangelicals will have a
difficult time agreeing to this.
2He indicates he is working on a book on revelation, so we must
wait for that before making a final judgment on his view of the
relationship.
3At various points, he does argue that opposition to the idea will be
the result of inbred conservatism, but he does not argue for the idea
as opposed to others sufficiently.
*So, that many people today define "love" solely as the emotions
associated with biological attraction is no warrant to interpret "love"
in that way in the Bible.
John N. Oswalt
Professor of Biblical Studies
Asbury Theological Seminary
The Rich Christian in the Church of the Early Empire, by L. Wm.
Countryman. New York: Mellen Press, 1980, 239 pp.
Dr. Countryman is Assistant Professor of New Testament at Brite
Divinity School. This paperback volume is part of his doctoral
dissertation and is published in the group known as The Text and
Studies in Religion, this being Volume VII of that series.
The matter of stewardship of time and treasures has always been
important in the Christian Church, as indeed in the Israel of the OT.
Countryman's research deals with the problem of wealth on the part
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of Christians. To what extent is it a hindrance or a benefit? After an
introductory chapter dealing with wealth and poverty in the
Christian communities of Judea he moves to the thought of one who
was first to address himself seriously to this subject, Clement of
Alexandria. The author then moves to early Christians' attitude
toward wealth, the matter of almsgiving and the danger of riches
both to the possessor and to the church of which he's a member. The
study concludes with a case study of Cyprian of Carthage, who gave
away his wealth and became a bishop of the important church at a
crucial time in its history.
The author gives careful attention to the NT with its frequent
warnings against temptations experienced by the rich and the
consolation given to the poor. Jesus' words comforting the poor and
warning the rich and urging the rich young ruler to give all that he
had to the poor is followed by a survey of the epistles in which
almsgiving and the sharing of one's wealth is given high priority. The
most problematic is Jesus' statement that it's easier for a camel to go
through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter heaven � a
statement that so startled the disciples. Writing about 200 A.D.,
Clement of Alexandria published a homily entitled "Who Is the Rich
Man That Is Saved?" Clement's conclusion is that it is not mandatory
for every Christian to divest himself ofwealth. The important thing is
not how much money he has but the use he makes of it and his
attitude toward it. Clement insisted on the importance of relative
detachment from wealth and the cultivation of simplicity in lifestyle.
This must be coupled with generosity. It was not money itself, but the
love of money that was the root of all eyil. In spite of the example of
the believers in Jerusalem, very few of the early Christian authors
advocated a community of goods, nor did they insist that the rich
give up their wealth as did Barnabas.
Countryman analyzes the distinction between the Christian
concept of wealth and that of the Greeks in the pagan environment.
Greco-Roman philanthrophy was directed to relatives, fellow
citizens, or clients, and the donor expected some compensation in
return for his generosity. In contrast the Jewish Christian donor
expected to receive his reward from God and in the next life. This
distinction is very important in the study of the early Christian
stewardship. Studies show that often the rich were a problem in the
early church because they tended to dominate the church or they
would be nominal Christians without much real discipleship or self-
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denial. There often resuhed a rivalry between the clergy and the rich
people of their congregations. At the same time many churches were
dependent on the generosity of its wealthy members. In summary, it
was learned that wealth was good if the owner was generous in giving
to the poor and to the church without demanding a leadership role.
No one was denied membership because he was wealthy, but he was
constantly being warned of the hazards of wealth.
The author is very thorough in his study. The book is amply
documented and reflects a thorough acquaintance with his sources.
Many readers may find repetition and may wonder why the thought
could not have been expressed in shorter compass. The relevance of
the volume is seen in the affluence ofChristian churches, especially in
the West. The problem of being affluent and preserving a Christian
lifestyle is a problem in every generation and never more so than in
recent years. So the book is good both for the antiquarian and also
for the earnest Christian of today who wants to be a good steward.
George Turner
Professor of Biblical Literature, Emeritus
Asbury Theological Seminary
The NIV Interlinear Hebrew � English Old Testament, edited by
John R. Kohlenberger III.
The NIV Interlinear Hebrew-English Old Testament, edited by
J.R. Kohlenberger III in four volumes, offers student and scholar a
new reference work with a number of interesting features. These
finely bound, handsomely printed volumes contain a number of
distinctive characteristics which interlinears of the past have not
offered. The most important of these include a grammatically literal
rendering of each Hebrew word which will aid the reader in
discerning not only general meaning but also such matters as
pronominal suffixes and verbal inflections. Of lesser importance, but
equally helpful to the uninitiated, is an arrangement which allows
reading from left to right and thus one does not have to read
"backwards."
Kohlenberger's Interlinear opens with a helpful introduction
which, to this writer, may prove as valuable as what follows. He
discusses what an interlinear is, what it can do, and what it cannot do.
According to the editor, an interlinear does not attempt to make a
sensible translation but serves as "a source book for word studies and
for the study of Hebrew" (p. ix). Given a knowledge of the Hebrew
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alphabet, students may engage in basic word studies. For those who
have had some Hebrew, the grammatically literal text facilitates
learning by allowing them to read the text without constant reference
to lexicons and grammars. Kohlenberger is quick to point out,
however, that his interlinear cannot correct translations, give full
expression of the meaning of Hebrew words, nor serve as an
independent source of exegesis or interpretation. It would be well for
everyone making use of an interlinear (Hebrew or Greek) to read
these introductory remarks.
The editor is to be commended for a fair appraisal of the
advantages and limitations of an interlinear. There are, however, at
least two concerns raised by his remarks in particular and the
volumes in general. Even with the disclaimers a word of caution
should be voiced in regard to what may be gained from an interlinear
in terms of word study. If, for example, words derive their specific
nuance from context, then a word for word grammatically literal
rendering of words � a major "strength" of these volumes � may
prove a hindrance to significant word study. As well, a question is
raised in regard to the practicality of these volumes � particularly
for the novice in Hebrew. If students must first consult an analytical
before a standard lexicon, one wonders if typical readers will be
inclined "to go the distance" on the quest for meaning. As
Kohlenberger himself suggests, the new interlinear is most helpful to
those who already know a fair amount of Hebrew and wish to bolster
their ability to read.
David Kendall
Doctoral Student
Union Theological Seminary
The Book of Joshua (New International Commentary on the Old
Testament) by M.H. Woudstra. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 396 pp.,
$16.95.
This series of full-length commentaries on the Old Testament,
edited by R.K. Harrison, is being produced to match the already
published series on the New Testament. Woudstra is Professor of
Old Testament Studies at Calvin Theological Seminary and author
of several books on the Old Testament.
In the volume an Introduction of fifty pages precedes an exegetical
section of over three hundred pages. The four indices deal with
subjects, proper names, authors and biblical references. Seven
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outline maps are included. Fortunately, for the reader, the publisher
placed the footnotes at the bottom of the relevant pages rather than
at the end of chapters or at the end of the book.
The volume reflects the author's wide acquaintance with biblical
scholarship, especially European sources (Dutch and German). His
excellent analytical outline of the book of Joshua is inserted in the
text of the commentary. Each section is preceded by a printing of the
biblical text and the author's rather liberal translation of the
Massoretic Hebrew text.
Woudstra insists that the canonicity of any Bible book is inherent,
and self-authenticized; little account is taken of the historical process
in its canonicity (p. 41). The author's central concern is to call
attention to the avowed purpose of the book of Joshua which he
defines as showing how God's promises to the Patriarchs were
fulfilled in the conquest of Canaan; thus the book records the
culmination of the Abrahamic covenant.
The reader of the volume will likely be interested to learn not only
the contents of the book of Joshua, but also the perspective this
commentator brings to his task. This he takes pains to divulge. He is
modest about his major assignment, aware of the book's complex
ities and of the difficulty of solving problems. He is convinced of the
Bible's trustworthiness and of its relevance to readers today. He faces
the moral problems, such as the genocide of Canaanites, yet is
unwilling to characterize this as unchristian or subchristian. In this
he seems more cautious than Jesus who contrasted his own gospel
with certain elements in the Old Testament (e.g., Matt. 5: 12-45; Luke
9:52-56).
Since God is the author of the entire Bible, he affirms, one should
not say God changes in his methods. The author appears not to
accept the view that some portions of the Old Testament are more
revelatory than others (cf. Mark 10:2-9). One senses that when
reason and faith are in tension, as with the paradox of divine
sovereignty (in miracles) and human responsibility, reason must
yield to faith (p. 42). Of interest also is the author's preference of the
"German school" and textual studies over the English-American
"archaelogical schools" with new-found archaeological data.
Archaeology makes but little influence on this commentary, despite
the author's professed appreciation of its contribution. He finds, for
example, little evidence of the influence of Hittite covenants on the
covenant-theme in the Bible. He is noncommittal concerning the
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date of the Exodus and conquest but seems to prefer an early date.
There seems little evidence that the author has visited these biblical
sites � pictorial descriptions might have enhanced the exposition.
Woudstra minimizes the contrast between the books of Joshua
and Judges with reference to the completion of the conquest by
pointing out passages in the former which indicate some Canaanites
still unconquered. The author discounts Bible stories featuring
heroes and heroines: instead he stresses the theological message
conveyed, as if the two do not harmonize. In this he may be reacting
against some contemporary scholarship. The author, as a Calvinist,
also stresses monergism and minimizes synergism.
The overall result is a volume distinguished by its commitment to
the trustworthiness of this Bible book, its relevance to Christian
living, and which succeeds in its attempt to deal responsibly with
some in contemporary scholarship.
George A. Turner
Professor of Biblical Literature, Emeritus
Asbury Theological Seminary
An Index to the Revised Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich Greek Lexicon,
Second Edition by F. Wilbur Gingrich & Frederich W. Danker, John
R. Alsop (ed.). Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 198 1 . 525 pp., $10.95
paperback.
Indexes to All Editions of Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew Lexicon
and Thayer's Greek Lexicon, Maurice A. Robinson (compiler).
Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981. 89 pp., $5.95.
paperback.
These excellent tools enable students to locate words in three of
the classic biblical language lexicons, no matter what the person's
knowledge of Greek, Hebrew or Aramaic may be. Alsop's Index
gives entrance to the revised Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich Greek Lexicon
based on Bauer's fifth edition. It is a revision and correction of his
earlier index to the previous Arndt-Gingrich Lexicon (Bauer's fourth
revised and augmented edition). Because the index is arranged by
biblical text references, the student can easily move from any word in
any New Testament text to its treatment in the lexicon. Every Greek
word from a given text that is listed in the BAG Lexicon is given in
Greek type along with a translation, so that the work can be used not
only by persons skilled in Greek but also by those with little or no
knowledge of the language.
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Robinson's work provides the same service for the Hebrew and
Aramaic vocabulary of the Old Testament as it is treated in the
classic Brown-Driver-Briggs Lexicon and for the New Testament
Greek vocabulary listed in Thayer's Lexicon. Both indexes of
Robinson are arranged according to the reference number in
Strong's Exhaustive Concordance, making them also valuable tools
for persons with little or no acquaintance with the biblical languages.
Each of these lexicons is a gold-mine of exegetical and
bibHographic information. Robinson is to be thanked for drawing
attention again to Thayer's excellent work. Persons without the
advantage of a familiarity with the biblical languages will find these
works especially useful for word study. Students who do know the
biblical languages may find the time involved in locating words
reduced by these tools. Often a student wishes to know how the
lexicographers have treated not just a word in general, but the
nuance of the word in a specific reference. The Alsop Index, arranged
by text, can save an immense amount of time on such a search, since
the user is led to the specific quadrant of the page where the citation is
found in BAG.
David L. Thompson
Associate Professor of Biblical Literature
Asbury Theological Seminary
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